邮电通信工程建设质量管理办法（试行）
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邮电通信工程建设质量管理办法（试行）
邮电部
邮电通信工程建设质量管理办法（试行）
1993年4月28日，邮电部
第一章 总 则
第一条 为加强邮电通信工程建设质量管理，明确工程建设各方对建设项目应负的质量责任特制定本办法。
第二条 通信工程建设质量责任是指邮电通信工程建设的有关各方，在按照国家和部颁现行有关技术标准、规范（包括暂行技术规定），以及经审查批准的设计文件和合同文件等规定的质量要求进行建设中，各自所应承担的质量责任。
第三条 凡参与邮电通信工程建设项目的有关各方，都必须遵守本办法。本办法的组织、实施不能代替或削弱参与各方企业原有的质量管理工作。
第二章 主管部门质量管理的职责
第四条 邮电部基本建设司是全国邮电通信工程建设的主管部门，负责组织编制全国邮电通信工程建设的质量标准，质量管理制度等，并负责监督、检查各单位对国家和部颁质量标准、质量管理制度的贯彻执行情况。
第五条 各省、自治区、直辖市邮电管理局基建主管部门根据国家和部颁有关通信工程建设质量标准、制度，负责在本行政区域内的贯彻实施工作。
第六条 邮电部基本建设司对各级通信工程质量监督机构的工作负责监督、检查和指导。
第七条 邮电部基本建设司负责组织邮电通信工程建设质量情况的通报工作。
第三章 各级通信工程质量监督站的质量责任
第八条 邮电部通信工程质量监督站除承担一级通信干线工程、国家重点工程和部重要工程的质量监督外，并负责对各省、自治区、直辖市通信工程质量监督站的资质考核、人员培训和业务指导等工作。
第九条 各省、自治区、直辖市通信工程质量监督站除承担本行政区域内的通信工程项目的质量监督外，并负责对本行政区域内的各地、市通信工程质量监督站的业务指导工作。
第十条 各级通信工程质量监督站一律按照部颁《通信行业工程建设质量监督管理办法》和《通信工程质量监督工作程序》开展质量监督工作。
第十一条 各级通信工程质量监督站的监督员（包括专职或兼职和聘任）一律按照国家和部颁通信工程建设有关技术标准、规范（包括暂行规定）进行质量监督。发现违章作业者，及时纠正。
第十二条 各级通信工程质量监督站的监督员在质量监督工作中必须经常深入工地，了解质量情况，坚持原则，秉公办事，实事求是，保证质量监督工作的公正性和科学性。
第十三条 各级通信工程质量监督站对被监工程中发生的重大质量事故应会同有关各方认真处理，并负责向上级机关报告质量处理意见。
第四章 建设单位的质量责任
第十四条 建设单位应根据工程项目特点和技术要求选择符合资质等级要求的勘察、设计和施工单位承担建设任务。
第十五条 在工程建设中，所有承发包合同均应明确记载相应的质量要求，保修期内的质量责任及监督检查等条款。
第十六条 建设单位在收到工程项目初步设计批复后的一个月内应向相关通信工程质量监督站申办通信工程质量监督手续，并按《通信工程质量监督工作序》（试行）的要求履行各个阶段的质量责任。
第十七条 建设单位应按《邮电通信工程设备和器材出厂检验办法》（试行）的要求，承担设备和器材出厂检验的组织工作。
第十八条 建设单位应指派质量管理人员负责随工质量检查，了解掌握工程质量情况，并按《邮电基本建设竣工验收办法》要求办理随工验收手续。
第十九条 建设单位应按《邮电基本建设程序》组织单项工程的验收和全部工程项目的初步验收或竣工验收。
第五章 工程勘察设计单位的质量责任
第二十条 勘察、设计单位必须按各自的资质等级和业务范围承揽勘察、设计任务，严禁超越资质等级规定的范围承担任务。
第二十一条 勘察、设计单位应按国家和部颁现行的有关规定，以及经批准的可行性研究报告和合同要求进行工程项目的勘察、设计工作。
第二十二条 勘察、设计单位应对本单位编制的勘察报告和设计文件承担质量责任。勘察报告和设计文件都必须经过本单位的各级技术负责人审核。
第二十三条 勘察、设计单位的勘察报告和设计文件的深度应满足部颁《邮电基本建设设计文件编制和审批办法》中有关条款的要求。
第二十四条 勘察、设计单位应参加设计会审；做好施工图的技术交底，并派设计人员深入施工现场配合施工；参加工程项目的补步验收和竣工验收；进行设计回访。
第二十五条 设计单位应按《邮电通信工程设备和器材出厂检验办法》（试行）的规定，参加设备和器材的出厂检验工作。
第六章 施工单位的质量责任
第二十六条 施工单位必须按自身的资质等级和业务范围承揽相应的施工任务，严禁超越资质等级承担施工任务。
第二十七条 施工单位应坚持编制施工组织设计，对每项工程都应提出保证质量的措施，并按《邮电通信工程设备和器材出厂检验办法》（试行）的要求，积极参加设备和器材的出厂检验工作。
第二十八条 施工单位应按国家和部颁有关施工及验收技术规范的要求进行施工，并自觉接受质量监督机构的质量监督。
第二十九条 施工单位应为建设单位派出的随工代表的随工检查提供方便，并与之积极配合。
第三十条 施工单位在施工完毕后，应提供完整的施工技术档案和准确详细的竣工资料。
第三十一条 施工单位对所承建的工程项目，应按合同规定在保修期内负责保修。
第七章 设备、器材供应单位的质量责任
第三十二条 设备、器材供应单位，其产品必须符合下列基本要求：
（一）设备和器材的质量必须达到国家和部颁技术标准以及设计文件所列的技术要求；
（二）有出厂合格检验标志和证明；
（三）设备、器材的说明书应清晰，图实相符，备（附）件完整齐全；
（四）有邮电部的入网许可证（复印件）；
（五）包装及运输条件能保证产品质量。
第三十三条 设备、器材供应单位应按《邮电通信工程设备和器材出厂检验办法》（试行）的要求，为出厂（库）检验提供必要的场地、仪表和有关资料，并做好其它配合工作。
第三十四条 设备、器材供应单位应按合同规定，负责产品“三包”，做好售后服务工作。
第八章 工程质量责任的仲裁
第三十五条 当通信工程质量责任产生争议时，当事各方先行协商解决；协商无效时，由相关通信工程质量监督机构进行调解仲裁。
第三十六条 为了查明质量问题，需要对建设项目的有关技术指标进行复测检验时，由相关通信工程质量监督机构委托法定工程质量检验单位进行检测，其检测结果作为调解或仲裁的依据。
第九章 奖惩及其它
第三十七条 凡参与通信工程建设的单位，在签订承发包合同或供货合同时，在合同中均应包括详细的质量奖惩条款。为了确保质量条款的实施，建设单位可以从支付给设计单位、施工单位和设备、器材供应单位的费用中，分别扣除5％作为质量责任的风险抵押金。待竣工验收后，根据实际情况结清。
第三十八条 本办法解释权属邮电部基本建设司。
第三十九条 本办法自一九九三年五月一日起执行。
梅州市“一日游”管理办法
广东省梅州市人民政府
梅市府办〔2005〕2号
关于印发梅州市一日游管理办法的通知
各县（市、区）人民政府，市府直属有关单位：
《梅州市“一日游”管理办法》业经市政府同意，现印发给你们，请按照执行。
梅州市人民政府办公室
二○○五年一月四日
梅州市“一日游”管理办法
第一条 为加强对梅州市“一日游”的管理，维护旅游者和旅游经营者的合法权益，促进旅游事业的发展，根据国家、省、市有关规定，制定本办法。
第二条 本办法所称“一日游”，是指旅行社组织旅游者以团队或集中散客的形式，在梅州市行政区域内的旅游景区（点）进行观光、游览，并于当日返回住地的旅游经营活动。
第三条 市及各县（市、区）旅游局是同级人民政府负责“一日游”管理的主管部门，具体负责本行政区域内“一日游”的组织实施。
交通、公安、工商、税务、物价等有关部门在各自职责范围内配合做好“一日游”的监督管理工作。
第四条 凡在梅州市行政区域内从事“一日游”经营活动的单位和个人，均应遵守本办法。
第五条 凡申请经营“一日游”业务的旅行社，必须具备下列条件：
（一）取得《旅游社业务经营许可证》和营业执照；
（二）有符合规定的旅游专用车辆；
（三）有合格的驾驶人员和持证的导游人员；
（四）有完善的管理制度。
第六条 经交通主管部门批准从事“一日游”的旅游专用车辆应符合下列要求：
（一）证照齐全，车况良好，车容整洁；
（二）车内张贴统一的“游客须知”；
（三）车内张贴“一日游”线路图及线路价目表、游览点门票价格；
（四）车内张贴旅游投诉电话。
第七条 “一日游”经营者必须遵守下列规定：
（一）遵守工商、物价、旅游等有关管理规定，守法经营；
（二）为游客购买旅游意外保险；
（三）导游的讲解应健康、积极、规范。
第八条 “一日游”经营者不得从事下列行为：
（一）擅自将“一日游”经营有关证照转让给其他单位和个人；
（二）擅自提价或向游客加收费用；
（三）以任何方式向游客索要小费、回扣；
（四）不得随意更换行车线路和发车地点，不得来回揽客；
（五）雇用无驾驶证和导游证人员从事“一日游”工作。
第九条 “一日游”经营者违反国家有关法律、法规和规章的，按有关规定处理。
第十条 本办法自2005年2月1日起施行。
Chapter VI
General Rules of Evidence
under the WTO Jurisprudence
OUTLINE
I Burden of Proof under the WTO Jurisprudence
(ⅰ) General Rules Well Established in Violation Complaints
(ⅱ) Burden of Proof in case of Invoking an Exception
(ⅲ) Special Rules Concerning Non-Violation Claims
(ⅳ) Summary and Conclusions
II Admissibility of Certain Evidences
(ⅰ) Evidence Obtained from Prior Consultations
(a) Procedural Concern: Confidentiality of Consultations
(b) Substantial Concern: Necessity or Relevance of Evidence
(ⅱ) Arguments before Domestic Investigative Authorities
(ⅲ) Arguments Submitted after the First Substantive Meeting
(a) There is a significant difference between the claims and the arguments supporting those claims.
(b)There is no provision establishing precise deadlines for the presentation of evidence.
III Panel’s Right to Seek Information
(ⅰ) A Grant of Discretionary Authority
(ⅱ) The Admissibility of Non-requested Information
(ⅲ) Summary and Conclusions
IV Adverse Inferences from Party’s Refusal to Provide Information Requested
(ⅰ) The Authority of a Panel to Request Information from a Party to the Dispute
(ⅱ) The Duty of a Member to Comply with the Request of a Panel to Provide Information
(ⅲ) The Drawing of Adverse Inferences from the Refusal of a Party to Provide Information Requested by the Panel
V Concluding Remarks
I Burden of Proof under the WTO Jurisprudence
Generally, the question of whether a member acted in accordance with the agreement hinges frequently on whether and to what extent that member must demonstrate compliance or the complaint must demonstrate a lack of compliance. It is demonstrated that the burden of proof is a procedural concept which speaks to the fair and orderly management and disposition of a dispute. This is the issue of “the ultimate burden of proof for establishing a claim or a defence”. In this respect, the Panel Report on US-Copyright Act (DS160) states, “[w]hile a duty rests on all parties to produce evidence and to cooperate in presenting evidence to the Panel, this is an issue that has to be distinguished from the question of who bears the ultimate burden of proof for establishing a claim or a defence”.1
(i) General Rules Well Established in Violation Complaints
Art. 3.8 of the DSU provides that in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement -- that is, in cases where a violation is established -- there is a presumption of nullification or impairment. However, the issue of burden of proof here is not what happens after a violation is established; the issue is which party must first show that there is, or is not, a violation. In this respect, a number of GATT 1947 panel reports contain language supporting the proposition that the burden of establishing a violation under Article XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1947 was on the complaining party, i.e., it was for the complaining party to present a prima facie case of violation before a panel. This rule is taken on by the DSB.
With regard to the issue of burden of proof, the Appellate Body in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33) rules that: “In addressing this issue, we find it difficult, indeed, to see how any system of judicial settlement could work if it incorporated the proposition that the mere assertion of a claim might amount to proof. It is, thus, hardly surprising that various international tribunals, including the International Court of Justice, have generally and consistently accepted and applied the rule that the party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof. Also, it is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.” 2And this ruling is demonstrated to be well established in subsequent cases as a general rule concerning burden of proof.
For example, in Argentina-Leather (DS155), the Panel states: “The relevant rules concerning burden of proof, while not expressly provided for in the DSU, are well established in WTO jurisprudence. The general rule is set out in the Appellate Body report on United States - Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses, wherein it is stated that: ‘It is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption’.” 3
And in US-Cotton Yarn (DS192), the Panel rules in pertinent part: “The Appellate Body and subsequent panels endorsed this principle that a complainant bears the burden of proof. For example, the Appellate Body, in EC - Hormones, states as follows: ‘… The initial burden lies on the complaining party, which must establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with a particular provision of the SPS Agreement on the part of the defending party, or more precisely, of its SPS measure or measures complained about. When that prima facie case is made, the burden of proof moves to the defending party, which must in turn counter or refute the claimed inconsistency. This seems straightforward enough and is in conformity with our ruling in United States - Shirts and Blouses, which the Panel invokes and which embodies a rule applicable in any adversarial proceedings.’” 4
As a whole, on the one hand, as ruled by the Panel in Argentina-Ceramic Floor Tiles (DS189), “[w]e recall that the burden of proof in WTO dispute settlement proceedings rests with the party that asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. It implies that the complaining party will be required to make a prima facie case of violation of the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, which is for the defendant…to refute. In this regard, the Appellate Body has stated that ‘... a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party presenting the prima facie case’…”; 5 on the other hand, as noted in the Panel Report on US-Copyright Act (DS160), “[t]he same rules apply where the existence of a specific fact is alleged. We note that a party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof. It is for the party alleging the fact to prove its existence. It is then for the other party to submit evidence to the contrary if it challenges the existence of that fact”. 6
In sum, with respect to the general rules of burden of proof in the context of violation complaints, as ruled by the Panel in Japan-Film (DS44): “[w]e note that as in all cases under the WTO/GATT dispute settlement system - and, indeed, as the Appellate Body recently stated, under most systems of jurisprudence - it is for the party asserting a fact, claim or defence to bear the burden of providing proof thereof. Once that party has put forward sufficient evidence to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden of producing evidence then shifts to the other party to rebut the presumption.…”. 7Certainly, as noted by the Appellate Body in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), “[i]n the context of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement precisely how much and precisely what kind of evidence will be required to establish such a presumption will necessarily vary from measure to measure, provision to provision and case to case”.8
(ii) Burden of Proof in case of Invoking an Exception
As discussed above, generally, the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts a fact or the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. As to be shown, this rule applies equally even in case of invoking an exception.
In this context, it is a general principle of law, well-established by panels in prior GATT/WTO practice, that the party (the defendant) which invokes an exception in order to justify its action carries the burden of proof that it has fulfilled the conditions for invoking the exception. However, in the author’s view, to understand the issue concerning burden of proof in case of invoking an exception, which is different from the relatively clear burden of establishing a prima facie case of violation on the complaining party, it’s helpful to stress some points here, among which the key point is to be cautious while determine which defence is “affirmative” and therefore burdens the defendant to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the challenged violation.
In United States-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), India argues that it was “customary GATT practice” that the party invoking a provision which had been identified as an exception must offer proof that the conditions set out in that provision were met. The Appellate Body acknowledges that several GATT 1947 and WTO panels have required such proof of a party invoking a defence, such as those found in Art. XX or Art. XI:2(c)(i), to a claim of violation of a GATT obligation, such as those found in Arts. I:1, II:1, III or XI:1. Arts. XX and XI:(2)(c)(i) are limited exceptions from obligations under certain other provisions of the GATT 1994, not positive rules establishing obligations in themselves. They are in the nature of affirmative defences. It is only reasonable that the burden of establishing such a defence, i.e. invoking an exception in the nature of affirmative defences, should rest on the party asserting it. 9
However, as ruled by the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), “[t]he general rule in a dispute settlement proceeding requiring a complaining party to establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with a provision of …[the covered agreements] before the burden of showing consistency with that provision is taken on by the defending party, is not avoided by simply describing that same provision as an ‘exception’. In much the same way, merely characterizing a treaty provision as an ‘exception’ does not by itself justify a ‘stricter’ or ‘narrower’ interpretation of that provision than would be warranted by examination of the ordinary meaning of the actual treaty words, viewed in context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose, or, in other words, by applying the normal rules of treaty interpretation. It is also well to remember that a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party presenting the prima facie case.” 10
In short, during the process of the establishment of a violation, it’s generally up to the complainant to provide evidence concerning inconsistency, and only in case of limited exceptions the burden of proof rests upon the defending party invoking a defence in the nature of affirmative defences, such as those found in Art. XX or Art. XI:2(c)(i) of the GATT 1994.
(iii) Special Rules Concerning Non-Violation Claims
As suggested by the corresponding provisions, the most significant difference between violation complaints under Art. XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1994 and non-violation ones under Art. XXIII:1(b) is, while, when violation complaints are brought under Art. XXIII:1(a), the infringement of an obligation of the agreements is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment, from the fact of violation alone, by establishing a formal presumption, such a presumption does not exist in non-violation cases.
With the lack of such a presumption, and given the nature of the factually complex disputes and particular claims of non-violation nullification or impairment, the resolution of issues relating to the proper allocation of the burden of proof is of particular importance. In case of non-violation nullification or impairment, i.e., where the application of Art. XXIII:1(b) is concerned, Art. 26.1(a) of the DSU and panel practice in the context of the WTO Agreement and GATT jurisprudence confirm that this is an exceptional course of action for which the complaining party bears the burden of providing a detailed justification to back up its allegations.
This requirement has been recognized and applied by a number of GATT panels. For example, the panel on Uruguayan Recourse to Art. XXIII noted that in cases “where there is no infringement of GATT provisions, it would be ... incumbent on the country invoking Article XXIII to demonstrate the grounds and reasons for its invocation. Detailed submissions on the part of that contracting party on these points were therefore essential for a judgement to be made under this Article”. And the panel on US - Agricultural Waiver noted, in applying the 1979 codification of this rule: “The party bringing a complaint under [Article XXIII:1(b)] would normally be expected to explain in detail that benefits accruing to it under a tariff concession have been nullified or impaired”.
Art. 26.1(a) of the DSU codifies the prior GATT practice, which provides in relevant part: “the complaining party shall present a detailed justification in support of any complaint relating to a measure which does not conflict with the relevant covered agreement ...”.
